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In recent decades, the Internet has grown from being an experimental research network to a broadband commer-
cial platform. At the same time, the Internet has been facing 
many technical challenges such as complexity and inflexibility 
to meet changing requirements. To solve these challenges, 
numerous research activities such as the Clean Slate Internet 
program [1] and the Future Internet [2] have been started to 
develop appropriate solutions. A major outcome of the former 
is the idea of decoupling the control plane from the data plane 
in Internet devices (e.g. switches/routers) and embedding the 
control plane into one or more servers, called controllers. This 
enables independent evolution of the control and data plane. 
In addition, an interface between the data and control plane 
has been proposed. The most prominent protocol implement-
ing such an interface is the OpenFlow protocol [3].
The current research of OpenFlow focuses mainly on an 
out-of-band network (Fig. 1a) in which control traffic (traffic 
to or from the controller) is sent on a separate network [4]. Such 
an out-of-band network has the following main advantages:
• High security is provided for control/management informa-
tion because a separate network is used for communication.
• Access to the switches is possible through the separate net-
work even if there are failures in the data traffic paths. 
However, these networks are expensive to build due to the 
requirement of a separate network. Also, building a separate 
network may not be feasible in some scenarios (e.g. widely 
distributed central offices in access networks).
To solve the above problems, OpenFlow is required to be 
implemented for an in-band control network (Fig. 1b) in which 
control traffic is sent on the same infrastructure as the data 
plane [5]. However, for such a network OpenFlow does not 
describe how a switch can establish a communication path 
(e.g. control traffic path in Fig. 1b) with the controller. With-
out configuring these paths automatically, operators may face 
many manual configuration problems such as going into the 
field to configure the switches. In this article, we implement a 
method (known as bootstrapping) that inserts this information 
automatically in in-band networks. We refer to this as in-band 
control functionality.
In in-band control networks, control traffic may compete 
with data traffic for network resources (e.g. bandwidth) [6] 
as both share the same infrastructure. Therefore, due to an 
increase in data traffic, the control plane operations (such 
as new service establishment, failure recovery, load sharing) 
may suffer significant delay, and the controller and switch-
es may even disconnect. To solve these problems, we extend 
the in-band functionality by implementing separate queues 
for control and data traffic, and by serving the control traffic 
queue before the data traffic queue. We refer to this mecha-
nism as queuing functionality.
In in-band control networks, failures in the data plane 
(switch or link failures) can affect both data and control traf-
fic. As a loss in data traffic causes a disruption of service, and 
a loss in control traffic prevents any new service establish-
ment from the switches affected by failures, failure recovery is 
important for both data and control traffic. For failure recov-
ery, some networks offer carrier-grade quality (RFC 5654), 
meaning that a network should recover from failures within 
50 ms. Therefore, we explore two well known techniques, res-
toration and path protection, for fast failure recovery of both 
control and data traffic. In restoration, an alternative path 
is established after a failure. In path protection, a disjoint 
alternative path is established before a failure, and when the 
failure is detected, traffic is redirected to the alternative path. 
For failure detection in restoration, loss-of-signal (LOS) can 
be used because it can detect failures in any forwarding port. 
However, as LOS cannot detect failures in any path in protec-
tion, bidirectional forwarding detection (BFD) (RFC 5880) 
can be used.
We proposed in-band control and failure recovery function-
alities in [7] and [8] respectively. In this article, we extend these 
functionalities with queuing functionality and integrate BFD in 
OpenFlow switches for fast failure recovery. In addition, we 
report practical challenges for implementing these in existing 
OpenFlow packages, containing different OpenFlow versions. 
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Furthermore, we implement these functionalities 
in one of the OpenFlow software packages and 
perform extensive experiments. The experiments 
with in-band control show that the implemented 
method is suitable for all types of topologies. The 
experiments with queuing show that data traffic 
does not affect the communication between the 
controller and switches, and the experiments with 
failure recovery show that carrier-grade quality can 
be achieved in OpenFlow.
The following section describes our proposed 
functionalities, the third section describes practical 
challenges, the fourth describes experimentation, 
and the final section concludes the article.
Functionalities for OpenFlow
In-Band Control Functionality
For in-band control, each switch and the controller have to 
establish an OpenFlow session over a transport layer protocol 
such as TCP, SCTP, or UDP. As switches and the controller 
need a reliable connection between each other, TCP or SCTP 
are preferred over UDP. In addition, as not all the platforms 
support SCTP, TCP is mostly used for establishing sessions.
The method for in-band control may differ with the types 
of OpenFlow switches used in the network. Today, there are 
two types of OpenFlow switches: pure and hybrid [9]. Pure 
switches support only OpenFlow operations for forwarding 
packets. Hybrid switches support both OpenFlow and tradi-
tional switching operations (e.g. layer 2 Ethernet switching, 
layer 3 routing, and VLAN isolations) for forwarding packets, 
and are common with many manufacturers such as Brocade, 
Juniper, and Cisco. We implement a loop free in-band control 
method using hybrid switches. In this method, at the time of 
bootstrapping, a switch applies Ethernet switching operations 
to forward its own traffic and applies OpenFlow operations to 
forward control traffic of other switches.
We frame the following three challenges for implementing 
in-band control:
• Each switch needs to configure a unique IP address for itself.
• Each switch needs to know the IP address and transport 
layer port (e.g. TCP port) of the controller.
• Communication paths need to be established for the switch-
es (B, C, and D in Fig. 1b) that are not directly connected 
with the controller.
To solve the first and the second challenge, the following steps 
are performed:
• Each switch runs a DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration 
Protocol) client.
• Each switch runs a hybrid stack to forward its own traffic 
(e.g. DHCP traffic).
• The DHCP server is configured with a vendor-specific 
option containing the IP address and transport layer port of 
the controller.
• Either the DHCP server is located on the controller or the 
DHCP server and the controller share IP (sub) networks 
(direct communication) with the same switch (switch A in 
Fig. 1b). 
To solve the third challenge, the controller establishes commu-
nication paths through the switches that have already estab-
lished OpenFlow sessions.
Our in-band control method using DHCP solves the prob-
lems of configuring each switch with a unique IP address and 
other transport layer parameters (e.g. TCP port) of an Open-
Flow session.
The four steps to perform in-band control are:
1. Notification of the required network parameters.
2. Establishment of a TCP session.
3. Establishment of an OpenFlow session.
4. Discovering the topology. 
For the first step, each switch periodically sends DHCP 
messages to its neighbors until it receives a reply from the 
DHCP server. If a neighbor is the DHCP server, it replies to 
the switch (A in Fig. 1b). Otherwise, the neighboring switch 
may forward or drop the messages, depending on whether 
it has an OpenFlow session with the controller. In case the 
neighboring switch has the session, the controller allows the 
neighboring switch to forward the DHCP messages to the 
DHCP server. When a switch knows its IP address and the IP 
address of the controller (using DHCP), it runs ARP to know 
the MAC address of the controller. After knowing the MAC 
address, the switch performs the second step.
In the second step, the switch establishes a TCP session with 
the controller. Either it establishes the session directly (in case 
of switch A) or the controller specifies a session path (shortest 
path) through the switches having an OpenFlow session.
In the third step, the switch instantiates an OpenFlow ses-
sion with the controller [9].
In the fourth step, the controller discovers links of a switch 
after establishing the session with it. For this, the controller 
allows the switch to flood probe messages (Link Layer Dis-
covery Protocol messages). From the received messages, the 
controller discovers links of the switch [10]. In addition, the 
controller discovers links of DHCP clients (for switches B, C, 
and D) and the DHCP server on reception of DHCP messages 
from them, and the same flooding mechanism (as probe mes-
sages) is exploited to infer the location of the DHCP server. 
In this case, instead of probe messages, DHCP messages are 
flooded.
Queuing Functionality
A part of queuing functionality, i.e. the creation of queues, is 
out-of-scope for OpenFlow. However, with the OpenFlow pro-
tocol, a packet can be redirected through an already created 
queue. For the creation of queues, switches can rely on a sep-
arate protocol such as OF-Config (OpenFlow Configuration 
and Management Protocol) or OVS-DB (Open vSwitch Data-
base Management Protocol) [11]. For the case when switches 
do not support these protocols, vendor specific options of the 
OpenFlow protocol can be used for the creation of queues. 
Many switches such as HP, Reference, Indigo, Trafficlab1.1, 
and Trafficlab1.3 (Table 1) allow queue creation through ven-
dor-specific options. However, with these options, only a few 
types of queues (such as rate limiting queues) can be created. 
In this article, we propose to extend the vendor-specific option 
of switches to create queues with different priorities. In our 
proposal, the queue creation message of the vendor-specific 
option is extended to add a priority number, and therefore 
Figure 1. OpenFlow network: a) out-of-band; b) in-band control.
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on reception of this message, a switch can create queues hav-
ing different priorities using switch traffic control commands 
(e.g. Linux traffic control commands in the Reference, Traffi-
clab1.1, and Trafficlab1.3 switches).
In queuing functionality, the aforementioned extension is 
used for creating different queues for control and data traffic. 
The control traffic queue is given the highest priority, and 
hence is served before any other queue. When all switch port 
information is received, the controller creates the control traf-
fic queue on each port of the switch. For data traffic, the con-
troller can create queues either in advance or on reception of 
data traffic. In addition, when the controller receives traffic to 
define its forwarding, the controller adds a forwarding entry 
to redirect control traffic to the control traffic queue and data 
traffic to the data traffic queue. For separating control and 
data traffic, the controller uses the source IP address, destina-
tion IP address, and transport layer parameters of an Open-
Flow session in a forwarding entry of control traffic.
Failure Recovery Functionality
In OpenFlow, a switch sends an echo-request to the control-
ler after an idle timeout. If it does not receive an echo-reply 
before an echo timeout, it declares failures. The switch then 
tries to establish a new session. If it fails, it waits for a backoff 
timeout to re-establish the session. As the minimum value of 
idle, echo, and backoff timeouts are 1 second, failure recovery 
cannot be achieved in milliseconds. Therefore, we implement 
two fast recovery techniques, restoration and path protection, 
for single failure scenarios in in-band networks.
For implementing restoration, the controller depends on 
a failure notification (PORT_STATUS [9]) instead of the 
echo timeout to declare failures. The controller receives the 
notification when a switch detects LOS and still has a con-
nection with the controller. The challenge behind restoration 
is that the controller has lost communication with the affect-
ed switches and therefore it cannot establish paths from (or 
along) these switches.
To overcome the challenge, during bootstrapping the con-
troller establishes a one-hop restoration path together with the 
working path for control traffic. In this path, the source switch 
floods its own traffic, only one neighbor (which is along the 
working path) forwards the traffic, and other neighbors just 
drop it. On the failure notification, the controller first makes 
a list of affected switches that can be restored first and then 
restores the affected switches according to the list. This is 
done because the restoration path of affected switches may be 
along the switches that are affected by the failure, and hence 
before establishing the path these switches are needed to be 
restored.
In addition to restoration, failure recovery can be achieved 
by protection. Protection removes the need of establishing an 
alternative path after a failure by installing it in advance. We 
implement 1:1 path protection in which the ingress switch redi-
rects traffic to a pre-established disjoint alternative path when 
a failure is detected in the working path. For pre-establishing 
the path, the controller uses the group-table concept (fast-
failover) [9] at the ingress switch and uses the flow-table con-
cept in all other switches along the paths. With the group-table 
concept, two rules are kept for traffic forwarding. Before a 
failure, the ingress switch applies the first rule (which corre-
sponds to the working path), and after the failure it applies the 
second rule, which corresponds to the alternative path.
In addition to control traffic, we apply the above restoration 
and protection techniques for data traffic. However, in the 
case of restoration of data traffic, the one-hop restoration 
paths are not established in advance, and after recovering con-
trol traffic, data traffic is restored.
In the case of protection of both control and data traf-
Table 1. Feature required/present in different implementations of OpenFlow switches. VS is the vendor-specific extension;  
OVS-DB is the Open vSwitch database management protocol; VER is the Open vSwitch version.
Software 
component 
Reference 
switch  
(license BSD) 
www.open-
flow.org
Indigo 
(license 
Eclipse) 
www.open-
flowhub.org
Open vSwitch (up 
to VER 1.11.0) 
(license Apache 2.0) 
www.openvswitch.
org
Trafficlab1.1 
(license BSD) 
https://github.
com/TrafficLab
Trafficlab1.3 
(license BSD) 
https://github.
com/CPqD
In-band
DHCP client Yes Yes Not functional for in-band control Not functional Not functional
NORMAL stack Yes Yes Yes Yes Not functional 
TCP stack Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
OpenFlow 
stack Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Queuing
Queue 
forwarding Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Queue  
creation Yes (with VS) Yes (with VS) Yes (with OVS-DB) Yes (with VS) Yes (with VS)
Queues with 
priorities No No Yes (with OVS-DB) No No
Failure 
recovery
LOS failure 
detection Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BFD failure 
detection No No No No No
Group-table 
(fast-failover) No No No Yes Yes
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fic, BFD can be used. In BFD, a pair of switches transmits 
BFD packets periodically between each other, and if a switch 
stops receiving the packets, the path between the switches is 
assumed to be failed.
OpenFlow does not define how to run BFD in the switches. 
Therefore, we propose to integrate BFD in the local network-
ing stack of switches and add a vendor-specific extension in 
the OpenFlow protocol to run it through the switches. With 
this vendor-specific extension, the controller sends a message 
containing information about a BFD session (RFC 5880). 
Upon reception of this message, the switch runs the BFD ses-
sion on the local networking stack, which allows the switch to 
send BFD packets through its local port (reserved port of the 
switch).
In protection, when the controller establishes the working 
and alternative path between two edge switches, the control-
ler sends vendor-specific messages to edge switches to start a 
BFD session between them. In addition, the controller estab-
lishes a path for the BFD session, which follows the same path 
as the working path. Hence, when BFD detects the failure, the 
ingress switch declares the working path as a faulty path and 
therefore, the ingress switch can now apply the second rule.
Practical Challenges
Evolution of OpenFlow Specifications
Stanford University released specifications for OpenFlow 
known as version 1.0 and 1.1 in 2009 and 2011, respectively, 
and industrial players such as Deutsche Telekom, Google, 
Microsoft, and Yahoo! have shown substantial interest in this 
technology. These companies then formed ONF (Open Net-
working Foundation) to standardize and release the versions 
of OpenFlow according to their demands. Since then, six more 
versions (1.2, 1.3.0, 1.3.1, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, and 1.4.0 [9]) have been 
released publicly. Hence, the challenge is to choose which 
version to use for implementation of our functionalities. In 
addition, as OpenFlow is evolving quickly, not all versions or 
all enhancements of the released versions are implemented for 
OpenFlow.
Availability of Required Switch Components
Table 1 shows the availability of the required components in 
existing implementations. The functions of these components 
are described below:
With a DHCP client [12], a switch can generate/receive 
DHCP messages from the local port. With the NORMAL 
stack [9], a source switch can forward its messages using L2 
learning when it does not have an OpenFlow session with the 
controller. Using the TCP stack, a switch can establish a TCP 
session. Using the OpenFlow stack [9], a switch can estab-
lish an OpenFlow session. Using queue forwarding [9], traffic 
can be forwarded through queues. With the queue creation 
component, queues can be created in switches. Using queues 
having different priorities, queues can be served on a priority 
basis. Using LOS, a switch can detect failures in restoration. 
Using BFD, switches can detect failures in protection, and 
with the group-table fast-failover type, switches can change 
the actions of forwarding packets without contacting the con-
troller.
The existing implementations for required components 
are Reference switch, Indigo, Open vSwitch, Trafficlab1.1, 
and Trafficlab1.3 (Table 1). Reference switch [3] is the first 
software release of OpenFlow version 1.0. Indigo is a hard-
ware-switching release based on Reference switch. Open 
vSwitch is a production quality release of OpenFlow. Traffi-
clab1.1 is the extension of Reference switch to incorporate 
version 1.1, and Trafficlab1.3 contains version 1.3.0.
Table 1 shows that not all the required components are 
present in a single implementation. Therefore, the chal-
lenge is to integrate all the required components in one 
implementation. In addition, vendor-specific extensions of 
switches are required to configure queues with different 
priorities. Furthermore, BFD is not present in any imple-
mentations. Hence, it is needed to be either implemented 
fully or imported from any open-source implementations of 
BFD. Some modifications related to BFD are also required. 
The modifications are: running BFD sessions on the local 
networking stack; listening or sending BFD packets on the 
local port; and modifying a group-table entry on detection 
of a failure.
Availability of Required Controller Components
The required controller components are:
• In-band control, which can run in-band functionality on the 
controller.
• Queuing, which can establish queues (with different priori-
ties) in the switches.
• Failure recovery, which can implement restoration or pro-
tection for control and data traffic. 
Currently, none of the available controllers (e.g. NOX, POX, 
Floodlight) implement these components.
For the implementation of these components, the available 
controllers can generate several events. The events, which are 
important for the required components, are:
• Switch-join, which is generated when a switch establishes an 
OpenFlow session with the controller.
• Switch-leave, which is generated when a switch disconnects 
from the controller.
• Port-config, which is generated when the controller receives 
all port information.
• Packet-in, which is generated when a packet is received to 
decide its forwarding action.
• Port-status, which is generated when an LOS is detected or 
repaired in one of the ports in a switch. 
Using these events, all the proposed functionalities can be 
implemented in all the available controllers.
Experimental Studies
We implemented our proposed functionalities in Traffliclab1.3 
and in its compatible controller (NOX1.3). We used this 
switch because at the time of our implementation this was the 
only available soft switch containing the latest version and the 
group table concept. We implemented all the unavailable and 
non-functional software components (Table 1) in this switch 
using the mechanisms provided above.
The experiments are carried out using the emulat-
ed topologies described in Table 2. The pan-European 
topologies in Table 2 are basic reference topology (BT), 
core topology (CT), large topology (LT), ring topology 
(RT), and triangular topology (TT). The topologies that 
vary with the degree of meshedness are RT and TT, and 
the topologies in accordance with the number of switch-
es are CT and LT. The other used topologies are ring, 
star, random regular graph, and balance binary tree. For 
experiments, one of the switches is physically connected 
with the controller, and the DHCP server is located on 
the controller.
For the in-band experiments, we use a single node of the 
iMinds island of the OFELIA testbed [13], and mininet [14] 
is used for emulating topologies. For all other experiments, a 
node of the island is dedicated to a single switch or the con-
troller, and the topologies are generated using the emulab 
interface of the island.
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In-Band Control Experiments
In the case of in-band control experiments, the DHCP retrans-
mit timeout is kept as 1 second (minimum value) and the boot-
strapping time (the total time to establish OpenFlow sessions) 
of switches is calculated with respect to the distance from the 
controller. As the bootstrapping time for all pan-European 
topologies is approximately the same, we show the bootstrap-
ping time of all these topologies by a single bar (Fig. 2). In addi-
tion, at the distance where there is no switch in the topologies, 
no bar is shown in Fig. 2.
For one-hop, the bootstrapping time is approximately zero 
because the switch at one-hop does not wait for the DHCP 
timeout to retransmit a DHCP request. As the distance from 
the controller increases, Fig. 2 shows an increase in the boot-
strapping time, because the switches, which are n-hop (n>1) 
away from the controller, are able to establish the session, if 
at least one of its neighbors has an OpenFlow session with it. 
When more switches are located at a certain distance from 
the controller (at distance 2 for star, at distance 6 for bal-
ance-binary tree, and at distance 6 and 7 for random-regular 
graph), we found a significant increase in the bootstrapping 
time, because in this case the in-band component of the con-
troller receives lots of messages at about the same time. Until 
the controller replies, the messages 
stay in the packet-in buffer, increasing 
the bootstrapping time. In addition, 
as the buffer can overflow at some 
point, some of the messages have to 
be dropped. If a dropped message is a 
DHCP request, a switch waits for the 
next DHCP timeout to retransmit the 
DHCP request, and hence delays the 
bootstrapping time for an additional 
1 second.
With Queuing and Without 
Queuing Experiments
In these experiments, the rate of data 
traffic (Poisson distributed on an aver-
age interval) is varied on each link of 
the CT topology, and the impact of 
data rate on control plane operations 
such as new switch connection (boot-
strapping), new service installation, 
and failure recovery is calculated using queuing (Q) and with-
out using queuing functionality (WQ). Each link of the topol-
ogy is assigned a capacity of 10 Mb/s, and the size of data 
packets is 1000 bytes. All the results are calculated 50 times, 
and the average is shown in Fig. 3.
Figure 3 shows that under a low load (load < 0.9), boot-
strapping, new service installation, restoration, and protection 
time is comparable for Q and WQ. However, at a high load 
(load > 0.9), due to congestion WQ takes a significantly lon-
ger time than Q for bootstrapping, new service installation, 
and restoration. In this case, as the load increases, switches 
drop more control and data packets. After dropping control 
packets, switches and the controller have to retransmit these 
packets after their timeouts, increasing the delay in completing 
bootstrapping, new service installation, and restoration. More-
over, at a load >1.04, WQ has a lower protection time (less 
than 40 ms) than Q. This is because due to congestion, switch-
es have dropped some BFD packets (sent interval = 20 ms 
and timeout = 40 ms) just before a failure, allowing BFD to 
detect failures faster than in a normal condition. Furthermore, 
after a load ≥ 1.08, a large number of BFD packets drops in 
WQ due to congestion, and therefore BFD declares its tim-
eout without the presence of the actual failure (link failure). 
This is the reason for zero protection time in WQ at a load ≥ 
1.08 as traffic is already on the protection path at the time of 
failure. The results also show that all control plane operations 
take significantly shorter time in in-band control with queuing 
(Q) in all load conditions. Indeed, queuing functionality cir-
cumvents the competition between control and data traffic by 
implementing separate queues.
Failure Recovery Experiments
We performed the following three types of failure recovery 
experiments for in-band OpenFlow using queuing functionality:
• Control and data traffic.
• Multiple topologies.
• Switches disconnection experiments. 
In control and data traffic experiments, the failure recovery 
time is calculated for one of the combinations of restoration 
and protection for control and data traffic. In multiple topol-
ogy experiments, the recovery time is calculated for different 
types of topologies, and in switch disconnection experiments, 
the recovery time is calculated to show the impact of the 
increased number of disconnected switches along the recovery 
path. In the experiments, a failure is given by disabling Ether-
Table 2. Emulated topoligies.
 Topologies
#switches #links Switch degree
Min Mean Max
1
Pan  
European 
topologies
Core topology 16 23 2 2.88 4
Basicreference 28 41 2 2.93 5
Large topology 37 57 2 3.08 5
Ring topology 28 34 2 2.43 4
Triangular topology 28 61 2 4.36 7
2 Ring 100 99 2 2 2
3 Random regular graph 100 150 3 3 3
4 Balanced binary tree (height=5) 63 62 1 1.97 3
5 Star 100 99 1 1.98 99
Figure 2. Bootstrapping time for all emulated topologies. The 
error bars show the minimum, average, and maximum values 
of the bootstrapping time.
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net interfaces, and for restoration, LOS is used to detect fail-
ures and the failure detection time is between 50 to 60 ms. For 
protection, BFD is used and the failure detection time is about 
40 ms. All the results are calculated 50 times and the average 
is shown in Fig. 4.
In the control and data traffic experiments, the number 
of data flows (240 to 8400) is increased in the CT topology, 
and one of the combinations of restoration and protection is 
applied for control and data traffic. These combinations are: 
• Restoration of both control and data traffic (Rest-Rest).
• Restoration of control traffic and protection of data traffic 
(Rest-Prot).
• Protection of control traffic and restoration of data traffic 
(Prot-Rest).
• Protection of both control and data traffic (Prot-Prot). 
In all the combinations, Fig. 4 shows that restoration does not 
meet the carrier-grade requirement of 50 ms, while protec-
tion meets the requirement. In addition, the restoration time 
of data traffic (Rest-Rest and Prot-Rest) increases with the 
increase in the number of affected data flows, because as the 
number of affected data flows increases, a higher number of 
data traffic paths need to be configured after the failure.
In the multiple topology experiments, different types of 
pan-European topologies (CT, BT, and RT) are used, and 
we found that the restoration time increases with the number 
of switches in a topology, because in our implementation the 
path calculation time grows as O(n2), where n is the number of 
switches. In addition, as the degree of meshedness increases, 
the restoration time decreases, because in this case fewer hops 
are required for the restoration path, and therefore the con-
troller needs to configure fewer switches in the network. Fur-
thermore, protection does not require controller intervention, 
and therefore it is far less dependent on the network topology.
In the switch disconnection experiments, ring topologies 
are used, and the restoration time follows a linear relationship 
with the number of affected switches along the restoration 
path. For protection, the recovery time is always within 50 ms 
and meets the requirement.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this article, we have explored OpenFlow for in-band control, 
queuing, and failure recovery functionalities, and have per-
formed extensive experiments. The in-band control experiments 
conclude that the proposed method allows bootstrapping in all 
types of topologies. With this method, switches of emulated 
pan-European topologies have taken a maximum of 5 seconds 
to perform bootstrapping. The queuing experiments demon-
strate that in-band control traffic can be served first before any 
other traffic, and hence it can avoid competition with data traf-
fic for network resources. The failure recovery experiments 
conclude that restoration in OpenFlow does not allow achieving 
50 ms recovery, and protection for both control and data traffic 
allows achieving recovery within 50 ms. In our results, we did 
not take into account the propagation delay. Among all the 
presented results, the restoration time may significantly increase 
with the increase in the propagation delay, further strengthen-
ing the conclusion of the article that restoration cannot meet 
the requirement of 50 ms. As future work, the effects of prop-
agation delay can be studied to quantify the degradation of the 
restoration time with an increase in propagation delay.
Based on the presented emulation results, we believe that our 
functionalities can be applied in production networks. However, 
to improve the accuracy of results, our experiments can also be 
performed on real environment testbeds such as GENI (Glob-
al Environment for Network Innovations) or FIBRE (Future 
Internet testbeds/experimentation between Brazil and Europe). 
Using these testbeds, OpenFlow hardware switches can be used 
for experimentation and the topologies can be generated in real 
environment settings. In the experiments, the impact of real 
environment factors (e.g. hardware dependent parameters such 
as packet forwarding, processing, and queuing) on the results 
can be studied. For the bootstrapping time, we believe that this 
impact will be negligible, as the DHCP retransmit timeout (i.e. 
1 second) dominates the bootstrapping time. For the restoration 
time, the impact can be significant as the restoration time is 
measured in ms and a small variation due to real factors will 
influence the results. For the protection time, the impact will be 
negligible because only the ingress switch along the protection 
path is involved for the protection activity.
In this article, we have not explored security and controller 
failure issues for in-band OpenFlow. For security, there can 
be many concerns related to DHCP [12], transport layer [15], 
and OpenFlow messages. These concerns are security issues 
related to:
• TCP or DHCP requests from bad actors.
• DHCP messages from an unauthorized DHCP server.
• Denial of service from the DHCP server or the controller.
• Switch datapath ID conflicts.
Nevertheless, transport layer security (TLS) described in 
OpenFlow [9] can be applied in the bootstrapping phase. 
Figure 3. Impact of data traffic on control plane operations. 
WQ means in-band control without queuing functionality 
and Q means in-band control with queuing functionality.
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However, the problem is that OpenFlow does not provide any 
details of TLS operations. This could lead to interoperability 
issues. In addition, TLS has many technical barriers for oper-
ators. These are:
• Assigning controller certificates.
• Assigning switch certificates.
• Signing the certificates with a private key.
• Installing the keys and certificates into all network devices.
In future work, we will consider the aforementioned security 
issues and will explore controller failure solutions for in-band 
OpenFlow. To solve the controller failure issues, we will use 
two controllers. Hence, when one controller crashes, switches 
can rely on a backup controller to take actions.
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